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Abstract
When …rms are heterogeneous, there may not exist a common collusive price that
raises all …rms’pro…ts. However it is shown that there always exists a common minimum price that raises all …rms’pro…ts.
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Introduction

In practice, one of the primary challenges faced by …rms desiring to collude is that they are
often highly asymmetric. Firms can have di¤erent products and costs and this manifests
itself in terms of di¤erent prices and quantities under competition. The stability of collusion
then depends on …nding a collusive outcome (and a strategy) such that all of these asymmetric …rms …nd it incentive compatible to adhere to it. At a minimum, each …rm’s pro…t
under collusion must exceed that which it earned when …rms were competing. If …rms can
coordinate on any price vector then this latter condition is not a problem as there will always
exist a collection of prices that makes all …rms better o¤.
The problem that arises in practice is that agreeing to and coordinating on a di¤erent
price for each …rm will probably require extensive communication among …rms which enhances the possibility that they will be discovered and convicted for engaging in unlawful
collusion. An alternative is for …rms to coordinate in a simpler manner that would require
far less communication and coordination. One well-documented approach is price leadership
whereby a …rm takes the role of price leader, selects a price, and then all …rms match that
This research has been conducted with the …nancial support of the National Science Foundation (SES1148129).
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price. While that will surely lead to higher pro…ts for all …rms when …rms are similar in cost
and demand, that is not true when …rms are su¢ ciently di¤erent. For example, suppose …rms
have di¤erent prices and market shares under competition because their products appeal to
di¤erent market segments and, in addition, some …rms have relatively elastic …rm demand
(which is why they set relatively low prices). If all …rms were to set the same price then
those …rms with more elastic demand would realize a large drop in sales and thus could be
worse o¤ than under competition. Or suppose …rms have di¤erent costs. If …rms coordinate
on a price above the highest competitive price then the lowest-cost (and lowest-priced) …rms
may not …nd it pro…table because their market share has signi…cantly declined; and if they
coordinate on a price below the highest competitive price (but above the lowest competitive
price) then the highest-cost (and highest-priced) …rms may not …nd it pro…table because
their margins are too small. For example, Goto and Iizuka (2014) examined an attempt by
medical care providers to coordinate on the price charged for the ‡u vaccine and found that,
at every common price, some …rms would be earning lower pro…ts than under competition.
A number of trade associations have pursued a di¤erent simple strategy to promote
collusion among their members. Firms are asked to abide by a minimum price; that is, all
…rms charge a price at least as high as some minimum level and are otherwise unconstrained.
The U.S. Department of Justice pursued a case against the Association of Retail Agents for
"organizing a boycott of their members against airlines, hotels, and car rental companies
who refused to adhere to ARTA’s recommended minimum travel commission levels."1 The
U.S. Federal Trade Commission brought a case against North Texas Specialty Physicians
where, among other anti-competitive activities, it had encouraged members to reject fees
below some minimum level.2 The Competition Commission of Singapore pursued a case
against 16 bus operators and their trade association for colluding on the price of bus services
from Singapore to Malaysia and Southern Thailand. One of the infringements was that the
Express Bus Agencies Association announced a minimum selling price.3 Finally, returning to
the ‡u vaccine case mentioned above, the medical association that orchestrated the collusion
actually did so by putting forth a minimum recommended price of $38.
The contribution of this paper is to show that, regardless of the extent of …rm heterogeneity, there is always a minimum price that will make all …rms better o¤. Consider a
minimum price that lies between the lowest and the highest competitive prices. By causing
the lowest-priced …rms to raise their prices to this minimum, it is immediate that all of the
higher-priced …rms are better o¤. What is less clear is whether the lowest-priced …rms are
better o¤ from having raised their prices. We show there always exists a minimum price
such that all …rms, including the lowest-priced …rms, are better o¤. Thus, an appropriately
chosen minimum price can result in supracompetitive prices that are sustainable.
1

Anne K. Bingaman, "Recent Enforcement Actions by the Antitrust Division Against Trade Associations," 32nd Annual Symposium of the Trade Association and Antitrust Law Committee of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, April 25, 1996.
2
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Cir., May 14, 2008)
3
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CCS Fines 16 Coach Operators and their Trade Association SGD1.69 Million for Price Fixing," Ai Ai Wong and Ken Chia, Baker & McKenzie,
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Model

Consider n
function is
A1

i

2 …rms choosing prices where (p1 ; :::; pn ) is the price vector and …rm i’s pro…t
i (p1 ; :::; pn ), i = 1; :::; n:

(p1 ; :::; pn ) : p; p

n

! [0; 1) is a bounded, twice continuously di¤erentiable function.

A2 For all (p1 ; :::; pi 1 ; pi+1 ; :::; pn ) 2 p; p
A3 @
A4 @ 2

i

n 1

;@

i

(p1 ; :::; pi 1 ; p; pi+1 ; :::; pn ) =@pi < 0:

(p1 ; :::; pn ) =@pj > 0 for all j 6= i:
i

(p1 ; :::; pn ) =@pi @pj > 0 for all j 6= i

A …rm’s pro…t is increasing in other …rms’prices (A3) and prices are strategic complements
(A4).
By these assumptions, there exists a non-decreasing best reply function i (p i ) ; where
p i (p1 ; :::; pi 1 ; pi+1 ; :::; pn ) ;
i

(p i ) = arg max
pi

i

(p1 ; :::; pn ) :

By A2, the upper bound on price is not a binding constraint in which case i (p i ) < p:
By Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) (hereafter referred to as MR90), these
assumptions are su¢ cient to ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium which we denote:
pei p =

i

pe1 p ; :::; pei

1

p ; pei+1 p pen p

; for all i = 1; :::; n:

(For purposes of the later analysis, the dependence of equilibrium prices on the minimum
price to a …rm’s choice set is made explicit.) There may be multiple equilibria. As shown in
MR90, there exists a smallest and largest equilibrium where the order is component-wise.
In the ensuing analysis, it is presumed that there is a unique equilibrium or, when there are
multiple equilibria, there is a selection of either the smallest or largest.
When p = 0, so …rms are not constrained to set a minimum price (only that prices are
non-negative), the selected equilibrium price vector is denoted:
p1 (0) ; :::; pen (0)) :
(p1 ; :::; pn ) = (e

(p1 ; :::; pn ) should be thought of as the non-collusive price vector; that is, the prices that
would emerge if …rms did not collude.
Thus far, assumptions do not ensure that there is an equilibrium in which all …rms have
positive demand. One approach at this point would be to impose more structure; for example,
assume symmetric demand functions and constant marginal cost that is not too high and
does not di¤er too much across …rms. In the spirit of generality, it is instead assumed there
is an interior equilibrium and it is heterogeneous.
A5 pi 2 (0; p) and

i

i

(p1 ; :::; pn ) > 0; i = 1; :::; n:

A6 There exists m 2 f1; :::; n

1g such that p1 =
3

= pm < pm+1

pn :
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Result

Now consider the in…nitely repeated game with perfect monitoring for which the stage game
is the game described in Section 2. As motivated in the Introduction, I will consider collusion
in terms of …rms required to set price at or above some agreed-upon minimum level, which
is denoted p. As long as all …rms have always priced at least as high as p, each …rm will
continue to abide by the convention of pricing at or above p. If any …rm prices below p,
collusion ends and there is a return to static Nash equilibrium prices.4 More formally, the
strategy is
pei p if pj p for all
pi otherwise.
t = 1; 2; :::; i = 1; :::; n

pti =

t

1; for all j

Given that other …rms’ future prices are the same as long as …rm i prices at least as
high as p; optimality (along the equilibrium path) requires that …rm i choose the price
that maximizes current pro…t subject to pricing at least as high as p. Given that must be
true for all …rms, it follow from the analysis of Section 2 that equilibrium requires …rm i
to price at pei p . If …rms’ discount factors are su¢ ciently close to one then this strategy
pro…le is a subgame perfect equilibrium as long as the collusive pro…t exceeds the static Nash
equilibrium pro…t:
e1 p ; :::; pen p > i ; for all i = 1; :::; n:
i p
We now prove that there exists a minimum price whereby that is the case.
Theorem 1 There exists p > p1 such that

i

pe1 p ; :::; pen p

>

i;

for all i = 1; :::; n:

Proof. The proof has three steps. First, it is shown that, for a game among only …rms
m + 1; :::; n, Nash equilibrium prices are increasing in the prices of …rms 1; :::; m. Second, it
is shown that if p 2 p1 ; pm+1 then the equilibrium prices of …rms m + 1; :::; n are strictly
higher compared to p = 0. Third, it is shown that if p is su¢ ciently close to p1 then pro…ts
are strictly higher for …rms 1; :::; m.
As an initial step, de…ne Nash equilibrium for the game among …rms m + 1; :::; n when
p = 0 and they take as given prices for …rms 1; :::; m. For that game, pbi (p1 ; :::; pm ) denotes
a Nash equilibrium price:
pbi (p1 ; :::; pm ) =

i

(p1 ; :::; pm ; pbm+1 (p1 ; :::; pm ) ; :::; pbn (p1 ; :::; pm )) ; i = m + 1; :::; n:

By Theorem 4 of MR90, a Nash equilibrium exists. Again, any statement with regards to
this equilibrium refers to the smallest or largest and the selection is assumed to be the same
selection as with (p1 ; :::; pn ). Note that
pbi (p1 ; :::; pm ) = pi ; i = m + 1; :::; n:

By Theorem 6 of MR90, pbi (p1 ; :::; pm ) is non-decreasing in pj , j = 1; :::; m. In using
Theorem 6 for the game among …rms m + 1; :::; n, we are treating (p1 ; :::; pm ) as exogenous
4

The particular form of punishment is unimportant for the analysis.
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variables which, by our assumptions, satisfy A50 in MR90. Furthermore, if pbi (p1 ; :::; pm ) 2
p; p then pbi (p1 ; :::; pm ) is increasing in (p1 ; :::; pm ), as I now show. If pbi (p1 ; :::; pm ) 2 p; p
then it satis…es:
@

i

(p1 ; :::; pm ; pbm+1 (p1 ; :::; pm ) ; :::; pbn (p1 ; :::; pm ))
= 0:
@pi

If p00 (p001 ; :::; p00m ) (p01 ; :::; p0m ) p0 with strict inequality for at least one component then
it follows from @ 2 i (p1 ; :::; pn ) =@pi @pj > 0 that
(p00 ) ; pbi (p0 ) ; pbi+1 (p00 ) ; :::; pbn (p00 ))
@pi
0
0
0
@ i (p ; pbm+1 (p ) ; :::; pbn (p ))
= 0:
>
@pi
@

i

(p00 ; pbm+1 (p00 ) ; :::; pbi

1

That is, given …rms 1; :::; m are pricing higher at p00 and …rm j = m + 1; :::; n (except
…rm i) is pricing weakly higher at pbj (p00 ) , …rm i’s pro…t is increasing in its price when
evaluated at its original equilibrium price pbi (p0 ). Hence, pbi (p00 ) > pbi (p0 ) ; and this holds for
all i = m + 1; :::; n.
Consider a minimum price that is greater than the lowest equilibrium price and less than
the next-to-lowest equilibrium price: p1 < p < pm+1 . Given that pej p
p by assumption
then p > pj implies pej p > pj ; j = 1; :::; m: Next note that, given …rm j (= 1; :::; m) prices
higher at pej p ; the equilibrium price for …rm i (= m + 1; :::; n) in the game among …rms
m + 1; :::; n exceeds the original equilibrium price:
pbi pe1 p ; :::; pem p

> pi ; i = m + 1; :::; n:

This is true because pbi (p1 ; :::; pm ) is increasing in (p1 ; :::; pm ), pe1 p ; :::; pem p
and pbi (p1 ; :::; pm ) = pi : We then have
pbi pe1 p ; :::; pem p

> (p1 ; :::; pm ) ;

> pi > p; i = m + 1; :::; n

and, therefore, pbi pe1 p ; :::; pem p > p. Given that these n
by the minimum price p, it follows that
pei p = pbi pe1 p ; :::; pem p

m …rms are not constrained

; i = m + 1; :::; n:

Recall that pbi (p1 ; :::; pm ) is the equilibrium price in the game among …rms m + 1; :::; n when
p = 0.
In sum, at the minimum price p 2 p1 ; pm+1 , pei p
p > pi (i = 1; :::; m) and
pei p > pi (i = m + 1; :::; n). First note that …rms m + 1; :::; n are earning strictly higher
pro…t:
e1 p ; :::; pen p > i ; i = m + 1; :::; n:
(1)
i p

Given all rival …rms are pricing higher - pej p > pj for all j 6= i - and …rm i’s pro…t is
increasing in rival …rms’ prices, …rm i’s pro…t is strictly higher at its original equilibrium
price:
e1 p ; :::; pei 1 p ; pi ; pei+1 p ; :::; pen p > i ;
i p
5

which implies its pro…t is higher at the new equilibrium price as stated in (1).
I then just need to derive su¢ cient conditions for the pro…ts of …rms 1; :::; m to be higher.
We will show that if p = p1 + " then
i

pe1 p ; :::; pen p

>

i;

i = 1; :::; m

for " > 0 and su¢ ciently small. Wlog, consider …rm 1. Given the other …rms’new prices,
…rm 1’s equilibrium pro…t has a lower bound associated with it pricing at p = p1 + " :
1

(e
p1 (p1 + ") ; :::; pen (p1 + "))

1

(p1 + "; pe2 (p1 + ") ; :::; pen (p1 + ")) :

(2)

Given pei (p1 + ") p1 + "(= p) for i = 2; :::; m and …rm 1’s pro…t is increasing in rival …rms’
prices, it follows that
(p1 + "; pe2 (p1 + ") ; :::; pen (p1 + "))
em+1 (p1 + ") ; :::; pen (p1 + ")) :
1 (p1 + "; :::; p1 + "; p

(3)

(p1 + "; :::; p1 + "; pem+1 (p1 + ") ; :::; pen (p1 + "))
1 p1 + "; :::; p1 + "; m+1 (p1 + ") ; :::; n (p1 + ") :

(4)

1

Since pei p ; i = m + 1; :::; n, has been shown to be strictly increasing in p for p 2 p1 ; pm+1 ;
there exists a di¤erentiable, strictly increasing function i (p1 + ") 2 [pi ; pei (p1 + ")] which
acts as a lower bound on pei p . (Note that we are not assured that pei p is di¤erentiable
everywhere.) Given …rm 1’s pro…t is increasing in rival …rms’prices, it follows that:
1

Combining (2)-(4):
1

(e
p1 (p1 + ") ; :::; pen (p1 + "))

p1 + "; :::; p1 + ";

1

m+1

(p1 + ") ; :::;

n

(p1 + ") ;

so the RHS is a lower bound on …rm 1’s equilibrium pro…t when the minimum price is p1 + ".
It is then su¢ cient to prove that this lower bound exceeds the original equilibrium pro…t:
1

p1 + "; :::; p1 + ";

m+1

(p1 + ") ; :::;

n

(p1 + ") >

(5)

1:

Take the derivative of the LHS of (5) with respect to "
d

1

p1 + "; :::; p1 + ";

m+1

(p1 + ") ; :::;

n

(p1 + ")

(p1 + ") ; :::;

n

(p1 + ")

d"
=

@

+
+

1

p1 + "; :::; p1 + ";

m
X
@
i=2
n
X

i=m+1

1

m+1

@p1
p1 + "; :::; p1 + ";

m+1

(p1 + ") ; :::;

n

(p1 + ")

@pi
@

1

p1 + "; :::; p1 + ";

m+1

@pi
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(p1 + ") ; :::;

n

(p1 + ") @

i

(p1 + ")
@"

Evaluate at " = 0 :
d

p1 ; :::; pm ;

(p1 ) ; :::;

(p1 )

(p1 ; :::; pn )
d"
d"
m
n
X
@ 1 (p1 ; :::; pn ) X @ 1 (p1 ; :::; pn )
@ 1 (p1 ; :::; pn ) @ i (p1 )
=
+
+
@p1
@p
@pi
@"
i
i=2
i=m+1
=

1

m
X
@
i=2

1

m+1

n
X
@
(p1 ; :::; pn )
+
@pi
i=m+1

@ 1 (p1 ;:::;pn )
because
= 0 and
@p1
0
true 8" 2 (0; " ) :

@

1

(p1 ;:::;pn )
@pi

n

1

=

d

1

(p1 ; :::; pn ) @ i (p1 )
>0
@pi
@"

> 0: It then follows that 9"0 > 0 such that (5) is

A minimum price that only binds for the lowest-priced …rms is clearly bene…cial to the
other …rms because their lower-priced rivals have raised their prices. The problematic issue
is whether the lowest-priced …rms are better o¤. Holding …xed their rival …rms’prices, that
is not necessarily the case (and clearly is not the case when m = 1) because the lowest-priced
…rms are pricing above their best reply functions. Of course, the rival …rms are not holding
their prices …xed but instead are raising their prices because the lowest-priced …rms have
raised their prices. This rise in rivals’prices enhances the pro…ts of those …rms which raised
their prices to the minimum level.
E¤ectively, the minimum price requirement is causing the lowest-priced …rms to act like
Stackelberg leaders. They raise price to satisfy the required minimum and the other …rms
respond by raising their prices. The latter is a …rst-order positive e¤ect on the pro…ts of the
lowest-priced …rms while the former is a second-order negative e¤ect; hence, the lowest-priced
…rms earn higher pro…t.
In conclusion, regardless of the heterogeneity of …rms, there always exists a minimum
price such that if …rms price optimally subject to that minimum price constraint then all
…rms’pro…ts are higher compared to competition. If …rms are su¢ ciently patient, they can
then collude using the convention that all …rms’prices respect some minimum level.
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